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Free Speech Coalition v. Reno:
Has the Ninth Circuit Given Child
Pornographers a New Tool
to Exploit Children?
By MICHAEL J. ENG*
"The care of children is a sacred trust and should not be abused by
those who seek to profit through a commercial network based
upon the exploitation of children."
1
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IS a growing national problem. In 1995
federal investigators filed more child pornography cases than in any
previous year.2 The annual increase in cases was higher than in any
year since 1986.3 Advances in computer and computer imaging tech-
nology have only exacerbated the problem. With these technological
advances, child pornographers can now create child pornography
without using "real" children.4 The computer-generated images
pornographers can create are virtually indistinguishable from child
pornography using real children. In addition to revolutionizing the
production of child pornography, technological changes facilitated its
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1. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (quoting 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 910,
§ 1).
2. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 16 (1996) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of
Kevin DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
3. See id. at 17.
4. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998), which is examined extensively in this Note, does not explicitly use the term
"real" children. However, the Ninth Circuit did in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d
1083 (9th Cir. 1999), stating: "Throughout the legislative history, Congress has defined the
problem of child pornography in terms of real children." Id. at 1089. In this Note, the term
"real" children means those children who are actually involved in the production of child
pornography.
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distribution. As of December 1995, nearly one million sexually explicit
pictures of children were on the Internet at any given time.5 Of these
pictures, over eight hundred were graphic depictions of "adults or
teenagers engaged in sexual activity with children between eight and
ten years of age."'6 In 1996, to combat these new problems with child
pornography, Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention
Act 7 ("CPPA").
In late 1999, the Ninth Circuit, in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,8
struck down provisions of the CPPA.9 Based on its interpretation of
prior case law, the court reasoned that Congress may criminalize child
pornography where actual children are used to produce the porno-
graphic materials, 10 but Congress may not constitutionally proscribe
virtual child pornography. 1 The Ninth Circuit's Free Speech decision
created a split in authority with the First and Eleventh Circuits. 12
This Note focuses on the Ninth Circuit's holding in Free Speech
and criticizes the court's opinion as being contrary to prior case law
and detailed congressional findings. Part I discusses the problems cre-
ated by recent technological advances, which prompted Congress to
enact the CPPA. This section also reviews important Supreme Court
cases establishing the constitutional framework for analyzing child
pornography, and recent cases upholding the constitutionality of the
CPPA. Part II focuses on the case itself, discussing both the majority
and dissenting opinions. Part III criticizes the majority opinion, rely-
ing on congressional findings, prior case law, and the dissenting opin-
ion. Finally, this Note concludes that, contrary to the view taken by the
Ninth Circuit in Free Speech, Congress possesses the constitutional au-
thority to proscribe virtual child pornography.
5. SeeJennifer Stewart, Comment, If This Is the Global Community, We Must Be on the
Bad Side of Town: International Policing of Child Pornography on the Internet, 20 Hous.J. INT'L L.
205, 207 (1997) (citing John Henley, The Observer Campaign to Clean Up the Internet: Hackers
Called in as Cybercops to Drive Out Porn, OBSERVER, Sept. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL
12065705).
6. Id.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
8. 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
9. See id. at 1097.
10. See id. at 1092.
11. See id. at 1086.
12. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
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I. Background
A. Advances in Technology and the Enactment of the CPPA
Congress's attempts to destroy the evils- of child pornography be-
gan with the enactment of the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977.13 Since then, Congress has made several re-
visions to the original legislation.1 4 However, with each revision child
pornographers found ways to circumvent the law's prohibitions.
1 5
This cycle recently repeated itself and caused Congress to enact the
CPPA.
With advances in computer and computer imaging technology,
child pornographers can now create computer-generated child por-
nography-i.e., pornographic materials that depict children engaging
in sexually explicit activity without using real children to create the
materials.1 6 For purposes of this Note, computer-generated child por-
nography is divided into two categories-virtual and computer-altered
child pornography. Virtual child pornography does not depict a real
or identifiable child. 17 Through a technique called "morphing,"18 the
image of a Playboy Bunny or Penthouse Pet can be scanned into a com-
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This original law prohibited us-
ing a minor to engage in "sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual
depiction of such conduct.., if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual
depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 2251 (a).
14. See, e.g., Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (eliminating the require-
ment that child pornography be considered obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), in order to be criminal); Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)) (banning child pornography advertisements); Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994))
(subjecting violators of child pornography laws to liability for personal injuries to children
who were used in production of child pornography); Child Protection and Obscenity En-
forcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251A-2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (prohibiting use of computers to trans-
port, distribute, or receive child pornography); Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4816 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (banning possession of three or more pieces
of child pornography); and a 1994 amendment, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 16001, 108 Stat.
2036 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2260 (Supp. IV 1998)) (criminalizing importa-
tion of child pornography).
15. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 1999).
16. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15 (1996). According to computer graphics specialists,
all that is required to create these pornographic materials is "an IBM-compatible personal
computer with Windows 3.1 or Windows 95, or an Apple Macintosh computer" and "off-
the-shelf imaging-editing and 'morphing' computer software costing as little as $50." Id. at
15-16. For a definition of "morphing," see infra note 18.
17. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1097-98 n.1 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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puter and transformed through animation techniques into a sexually
explicit image of a child. 19 Although the morphed image is "virtual," it
is practically indistinguishable from an "unretouched" photographic
image of a real child in a sexually explicit pose. 20 By contrast, com-
puter-altered child pornography depicts the image of a real or identi-
fiable child. 2' A photograph of an innocent child can be scanned into
the computer, and with the "cut and paste" feature, the child's head
can be superimposed onto the body of someone who is engaged in
sexually explicit activity.22 Furthermore, with image-altering software
and computer hardware, that same photograph of the innocent child
can be altered in such a manner as to remove the child's clothing and
to arrange the child into "sexual positions involving children, adults
and even animals."23
Recent advances in computer imaging technology have rendered
pre-CPPA federal law ineffective in two ways. First, because real chil-
dren are no longer needed to produce child pornography, these com-
puter-generated pornographic materials are placed outside the reach
of pre-CPPA federal law.2 4 Second, even where real children are used,
image-altering software can transform sexually explicit material in
such a way that it is impossible for prosecutors to identify the persons
in the material or to prove that real children were used in producing
the material.2 5 To close these loopholes, Congress enacted the CPPA,
amending the definition of child pornography.26 The CPPA defines
child pornography as:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, pic-
ture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where-
18. "'Morphing' is short for 'metamorphosing,' a technique that allows a computer to
fill in the blanks between dissimilar objects in order to produce a combined image." Debra
D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV.
J. ON LECis. 439, 440 n.5 (1997). For a demonstration of morphing, see Stephen Lines,
Semi-Automatic Morph Between Two Supermodels (visited Aug. 26, 2000) <http://www.ai.mit.
edu/people/spraxlo/R/superModels.html>.
19. See Burke, supra note 18, at 440-41.
20. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15-16 (1996).
21. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1097-98 n.1 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
22. See id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
23. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15.
24. Before the passage of the CPPA, federal law criminalized the production, distribu-
tion, and possession of visual depictions of real children engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
25. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 16.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. IV 1998).
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(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified
to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, de-
scribed, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impres-
sion that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.27
Accompanying the CPPA were thirteen detailed congressional
findings that justify proscribing virtual child pornography.28 The
CPPA also created an affirmative defense for pornographers who use
youthful-looking adults to produce pornographic materials and do
not market such materials as child pornography.
29
B. Prior Case Law
1. Constitutional Framework
a. New York v. Ferber
The first judicial decision upholding a state's attempt to elimi-
nate the scourge of child pornography was the landmark case of New
York v. Ferber.30 Ferber, the owner of an adult bookstore, was convicted
under a New York child pornography statute for selling two films that
contained images of young boys masturbating. 31 The New York Court
of Appeals overturned his conviction, holding that the statute violated
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV 1998). In general, Congress found that children
who were used in the production of pornographic images could sustain physical and psy-
chological harm; that pedophiles and child sexual abusers use child pornography "to stim-
ulate and whet their own sexual appetites"; that technological advances in computer and
computer imaging render it difficult to distinguish pictures of real children engaging in
sexually explicit activity from visual depictions of "virtual" children-i.e., computer-gener-
ated images of children-involved in such activity; and that protecting children from "sex-
ual exploitation provide [s] a compelling governmental interest" in proscribing both real
and virtual child pornography. Id.
29. See id. § 2252A(c). The affirmative defense could be raised to show that:
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or per-
sons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the
material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.
30. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
31. See id. at 752.
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the First Amendment.3 2 In reversing the high court of New York, the
United States Supreme Court unanimously held that "states are enti-
tled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children '3 3 and that the New York statute was not unconstitutionally
overbroad.3
4
The Court advanced five reasons for giving New York greater lee-
way to proscribe child pornography:3 5 (1) the state has a compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of chil-
dren;3 6 (2) the distribution of pornographic material depicting chil-
dren in sexual activity is "intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children";3 7 (3) "It]he advertising and selling of child pornography
provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of [its]
production";38 (4) child pornography has little or no social value;39
32. See People v. Ferber, 52 N.E.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. 1981).
33. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. The Ferber Court declined to apply the obscenity standard
enunciated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller defined obscenity as:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24. The Supreme Court. in Ferber was "persuaded that the [state legislature is]
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children." 458
U.S. at 756. According to the Ferber Court, the Miller standard:
does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling interest in prosecut-
ing those who promote the sexual exploitation of children. Thus, the question
under the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person bears no connection to the issue of whether a child
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the work.
d. at 761.
34. See id. at 766, 773. Under the overbreadth doctrine:
Litigants ... are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of
free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption
that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
... In such cases it has been the judgment of [the Supreme] Court that the
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpun-
ished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be
muted and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). However, a statute will be invalidated as
overbroad only if the overbreadth is "substantial[,] judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. For a discussion of the substantial overbreadth doc-
trine, see discussion infra Part III.B.1.
35. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-64.
36. See id. at 756-57.
37. Id. at 759.
38. Id. at 761.
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and (5) the acknowledgement and classification of child pornography
as a category of material outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment is compatible with Supreme Court precedent.40
The Supreme Court rejected Ferber's claim that the New York
child pornography statute was overbroad, stating that the overbreadth
doctrine is "strong medicine" and should be applied "only as a last
resort."41 The Court found that the New York statute's "legitimate
reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications." 42 While some
protected speech ranging from medical textbooks to pictorials in the
National Geographic might be subject to the law, these "arguably im-
permissible applications of the statute amount to [no] more than a
tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach. '43 The Court
held any overbreadth that may exist should be cured on a case-by-case
basis.
44
b. Osborne v. Ohio
In a significant subsequent decision, the Supreme Court upheld
an Ohio child pornography statute proscribing the possession and
viewing of pornographic materials in Osborne v. Ohio.45 The Osborne
Court accepted Ohio's three justifications for criminalizing the posses-
sion of child pornography: (1) decreasing the production and supply
of child pornography would in turn decrease the demand; 46 (2) en-
couraging possessors of child pornography to destroy the material,
which is a permanent record of a child's abuse;47 and (3) destroying
this material that "evidence suggests pedophiles use to seduce other
children into sexual activity." 48 By accepting this third rationale, the
Supreme Court signaled a willingness to go further than Ferber, sug-
39. See id. at 762.
40. See id. at 763.
41. Id. at 769 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
42. Id. at 773.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 773-74.
45. 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
46. See id. at 109-10. Given the importance of Ohio's "interest in protecting the vic-
tims of child pornography," the Court felt it could not "fault Ohio for attempting to stamp
out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain." Id. at 110.
47. See id. at 111. The Court explained that "the pornography's continued existence
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come." Id.
48. Id. at 111 n.7. "Child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing
child victims. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose
for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children having
'fun' participating in the activity." Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography, Final Report 649 (1986) [hereinafter Final Report]).
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gesting that the harm caused to children generally, not just those vic-
timized in the production of child pornography, qualifies as an
important government justification 49  for proscribing child
pornography.
2. Recent Cases Upholding the Constitutionality of the CPPA
a. United States v. Hilton
The first case to consider the constitutionality of the CPPA was
United States v. Hilton.50 Hilton was indicted for criminal possession of
computer disks that contained three or more visual depictions of
child pornography in violation of the CPPA. 51 The district court over-
turned Hilton's indictment, agreeing with his argument that the
CPPA was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and thus unen-
forceable. 52 On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and unanimously
held that "the law, properly construed, survived Hilton's constitu-
tional challenge. 53
While acknowledging that the CPPA implicated the First Amend-
ment, the First Circuit held that Congress could constitutionally ex-
pand the definition of child pornography to include virtual child
pornography.54 The Hilton court based its holding on the child por-
nography jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court in Ferber
and Osborne.55 The appellate court found that where child pornogra-
phy is concerned, considerations beyond the prevention of direct
harm to real children can be important government interests.56
The Hilton court then proceeded to consider whether the CPPA
was so overbroad as to capture constitutionally protected speech. In
ruling against Hilton's overbreadth challenge, the court reasoned that
Congress intended the "appears to be" language of the CPPA57 to tar-
get only those visual depictions that are "'virtually indistinguishable to
unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs"' of real chil-
49. The phrase "important government justification," as used in this Note, denotes
the ordinary meaning of these words as used in everyday parlance. The phrase is not meant
to connote a term of art used in constitutional jurisprudence.
50. 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999).
51. See id. at 67.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 65.
54. See id. at 76.
55. See id. at 73.
56. See id. at 70.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). See supra text accompanying note 27.
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dren engaging in sexually explicit activity.58 In addition, since child
pornographers cater to pedophiles, who by definition have a prefer-
ence for pre-pubertal children, the CPPA would only cover those
images of pre-pubescent children "who otherwise clearly appear to be
under the age of 18."59 Therefore, the Hilton court concluded that the
CPPA was not unconstitutionally overbroad.60
Finally, on the issue of vagueness,6' the First Circuit concluded
that the CPPA provides ordinary people with "sufficient definiteness"
as to what conduct is prohibited and does not "encourage arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement. '62 The court stated that the standard for
evaluating key language of the CPPA is "an objective one."63 "A jury
must decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether a rea-
sonable unsuspecting viewer would consider the depiction to be of an
actual individual under the age of 18 engaged in sexual activity."
64
Moreover, the First Circuit found that, under the statute,65 a prosecu-
tor must prove the element of scienter 66 to obtain a valid conviction
under the CPPA.67 In addition, the First Circuit found that the CPPA
offers an additional safeguard by creating an affirmative defense 68 to a
charge under the CPPA if the person depicted in the sexually explicit
material actually was an adult at the time the image was produced. 69
Taken together, these elements of the CPPA led the court to rule
against the defendant on his vagueness challenge. 70
58. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 72 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996)).
59. Id. at 73.
60. See id. at 74.
61. The vagueness doctrine is "[t]he doctrine-based on the Due Process Clause-
requiring that a criminal statute state explicitly and definitely what acts are prohibited, so
as to provide fair warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1548 (7th ed. 1999). "A statute will not be held void for vagueness unless it fails to 'define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement."' Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)). For a discussion of the void of vagueness doctrine, see infra Part III.B.2.
62. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) (Supp. IV 1998).
66. Scienter is "[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for
the consequences of his or her act or omission." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1347 (7th ed.
1999).
67. See Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. IV 1998); see also supra note 29.
69. See Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
70. See id. at 76.
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b. United States v. Acheson
Eleven months after the First Circuit rendered its decision in
Hilton, and just one month before the Ninth Circuit decided Free
Speech, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Acheson,71 unanimously
ruled that the CPPA does not run afoul of the First Amendment and is
neither unconstitutionally vague nor substantially overbroad.72 The
Acheson court's analysis was similar to that of the Hilton court. Quoting
Hilton, the court in Acheson concluded that since "'it is well-settled that
child pornography, an unprotected category of expression identified
by its content, may be freely regulated,"' the defendant's argument
that the CPPA is unconstitutional failed.7 3 Like the Hilton court, the
Acheson court found that the CPPA is not substantially overbroad be-
cause its application is limited to visual depictions of "'pre-pubescent
children or persons who otherwise clearly appear to be under the age
of 18.' 74 Finally, as in Hilton, the Acheson court held that the CPPA is
not unconstitutionally vague because in addition to imposing on the
government the burden of proving the element of scienter, the CPPA
offers an affirmative defense.75
II. The Case: Free Speech Coalition v. Reno
A. The Facts
Plaintiff-appellant, the Free Speech Coalition ("Coalition"), is a
trade association of businesses involved in the production and dissem-
ination of adult material. 76 The Coalition raised a facial claim, 77 seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief by a pre-enforcement challenge
to the "appears to be"78 and "conveys the impression"79 language of
the CPPA.8 0 The Coalition also challenged the constitutionality of the
71. 195 F.3d 645 (lth Cir. 1999).
72. See id. at 648.
73. Id. at 650 (quoting Hilton, 167 F.3d at 69).
74. Id. at 651-52 (quoting Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73).
75. See id. at 653.
76. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
77. A facial challenge is "[a] claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face-that
is, that it always operates unconstitutionally." BLACK'S LAW DICTrIONARY 223 (7th ed. 1999).
By contrast, an as-applied challenge is "[a] lawsuit claiming that a law or governmental
policy, though constitutional on its face, is... unconstitutional on the facts of a particular
case or to a particular party." Id.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). See supra text accompanying note 27.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D). See supra text accompanying note 27.
80. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1086.
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CPPA's affirmative defense. 81 The district, court held that the CPPA
was constitutional and granted the government's motion for summary
judgment,8 2 denying the Coalition's cross motion for summary judg-
ment.83 The Coalition appealed.8 4
B. The Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, 85 overturned the
district court's decision and held that Congress cannot constitution-
ally proscribe virtual child pornography.86 The court found the CPPA
unconstitutional on three grounds: (1) lack of compelling govern-
ment interests; (2) vagueness; and (3) substantial overbreadth. 87
First, the majority concluded that the government had not pro-
vided any compelling interest for banning virtual child pornogra-
phy.88 The court interpreted Ferber to hold that only preventing direct
harm to real children used to produce child pornography can be a
compelling interest.89 The court rejected the government's argument
that pedophiles use child pornography to "whet[ I" their own appetite
and to sexually abuse children. 90 The majority reasoned that to accept
the government's position would be to criminalize the "foul figments
of creative technology that do not involve any human victim in their
creation or in their presentation."9' In addition, even though conced-
ing that images of children engaging in sexually explicit activity are
morally repugnant, the court found that no factual studies currently
81. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1087. The affirmative defense the Coalition challenged
can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. IV 1998).. See supra note 29.
82. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1087.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1086-87.
85. The opinion was authored by the Honorable Donald W. Molloy, a district court
judge, sitting by designation, and was joined by the Honorable Sidney R. Thomas of the
Ninth Circuit. See id. at 1086 n.1.
86. See id. at 1086. The majority left unresolved the constitutionality of the CPPA's
affirmative defense. See id.
87. See id. at 1095, 1097.
88. See id. at 1095. The Free Speech court applied strict scrutiny because it determined
that the CPPA is a content-based regulation. See id. at 1091. The court cited Crawford v.
Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that if a statute is con-
tent-based, "the government must establish a compelling interest that is served by the stat-
ute, and it must show that the [statute] is narrowly tailored to fulfill that interest." Free
Speech, 198 F.3d at 1091.
89. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1092.
90. Id. at 1091-92.
91. Id. at 1093.
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link virtual child pornography to the subsequent sexual abuse of chil-
dren. 92 The court stated: "Absent this nexus, the law does not with-
stand constitutional scrutiny."93 Since the court did not find any
compelling government interest, it did not reach the narrowly-tailored
prong of the strict scrutiny test.94
Second, the majority concluded that the "appears to be"95 and
"conveys the impression" 96 language of the CPPA are unconstitution-
ally vague because both phrases are "highly subjective. '9 7 A person of
ordinary intelligence, the court found, would not have a "reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited."9 s At the same time, the court
concluded, the language allows law enforcement officials to apply the
CPPA in an "arbitrary and discriminatory fashion."99
Finally, the court ruled in favor of the Coalition on its over-
breadth challenge.1 0 The majority held that the CPPA is substantially
overbroad since it captures material that has been accorded First
Amendment protection.' 0 ' "That is, non-obscene sexual expression
that does not involve actual children is protected expression under
the First Amendment." 10 2
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Ferguson, in his dissent, concluded that Congress could
constitutionally proscribe virtual child pornography.10 3 Judge Fergu-
son began by articulating five justifications for the prohibitions found
in the challenged portions of the CPPA. First, relying on Ferber and
Osborne, he found that preventing harm to real children depicted in
sexually explicit images is not the only legitimate reason for banning
child pornography. 104 " [P] rotecting children who are not actually pic-
92. See id.
93. Id. at 1094.
94. See id. at 1095. For a description of the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review,
see supra note 88.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B) (Supp. IV 1998). See supra text accompanying note 27.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (D). See supra text accompanying note 27.
97. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1095.
98. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
99. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1095-96.
100. See id. at 1096.
101. See id. at 1095.
102. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982)).
103. See id. at 1097-98 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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tured in the pornographic image is a legitimate and compelling state
interest" for such a ban. 105
Second, the dissent concluded that the Supreme Court already
endorsed the government's interest in criminalizing child pornogra-
phy for seduction purposes. 10 6 As Judge Ferguson noted, the Court in
Osborne "recognized that states have a legitimate interest in preventing
pedophiles from 'us [ing] child pornography to seduce other children
into sexual activity." 10 7 Judge Ferguson also found that Osborne en-
dorsed a state's "legitimate interest in destroying the child pornogra-
phy market."'10 8
Third, the dissent argued that "[t] he lesson from Ferber and Os-
borne is that legislators should be given 'greater leeway' when acting to
protect the well-being of children."'1 9 He reasoned that since techno-
logical advances make it increasingly difficult to prosecute child por-
nography cases, Congress has an important justification to close this
loophole in existing law-the "built-in reasonable doubt argument"' 10
that defendants use as a legal defense."1
Fourth, Judge Ferguson concluded that, like real child pornogra-
phy, virtual child pornography has little or no social value.1 12 He rea-
soned that "It]he only difference [between real child pornography
and virtual child pornography] is that [the former] uses actual chil-
dren in its production, whereas [the latter] does not."' '13 He argued
that this distinction, although noteworthy, "does not somehow trans-
form virtual child pornography into meaningful speech."'"14
Fifth, the dissent argued that the majority should not have ap-
plied the strict scrutiny standard of review.' 15 Rather, Judge Ferguson
advocated a balancing approach, as indicated by prior Supreme Court
105. Id. at 1099 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Although Judge Ferguson used the term
"compelling interest," he did not argue for strict scrutiny review of the CPPA. See id. at 1101
(Ferguson, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 1099 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
111 (1990)).
107. Id. (FergusonJ., dissenting) (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111).
108. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1100 (Ferguson,J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756
(1982)).
110. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.c.
111. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1100 (Ferguson,J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 104-358,
at 16-17 (1996)).
112. See id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762).
113. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1100-01 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
115. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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decisions. 116 In particular, the dissent noted that, on the issue of cate-
gorizing child pornography, the Ferber Court held that "'the balance
of competing interests [was] clearly struck and that it [was] permissi-
ble to consider these materials as without the protection of the First
Amendment."1 17 Judge Ferguson also relied on the Osborne Court's
finding that the "'gravity of the State's interests' outweighed [an indi-
vidual's] limited First Amendment right to possess child
pornography." 11
Judge Ferguson also concluded that, because the CPPA merely
targets "a narrow class of computer-generated pictures easily mistaken
for real photographs of real children," it is not substantially over-
broad.' 19 Moreover, Judge Ferguson stated that the CPPA offers an
added protection, in that an affirmative defense 120 exists for per-
sons-like members of the Coalition in this case-who produce and
disseminate pornographic materials, so long as those materials use
youthful-looking adults at the time of production and are not
"pandered as child pornography. " 121
Finally, the dissent, agreeing with Hilton's void for vagueness anal-
ysis, 12 2 determined that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impres-
sion" language of the CPPA is not highly subjective. 123 The dissent
noted that there is an additional safeguard against arbitrary prosecu-
tions, in that the government must prove the element of scienter in
order to obtain a valid conviction under the CPPA.' 24
III. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Free Speech that Congress cannot
constitutionally proscribe virtual child pornography appears to ignore
detailed congressional findings, prior Supreme Court decisions, and
recent case law. These authorities all support the position that Con-
116. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764).
118. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111
(1990)).
119. Id. at 1102 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Omnibus Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 to -27 (1996) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (Supp. IV 1998)) [hereinafter Omnibus Act]).
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
121. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1102 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 104-
358, at 10 (1996)).
122. See United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74-76 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 115 (1999).
123. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1103 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
124. See id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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gress can constitutionally prohibit and criminalize virtual child
pornography.
A. Virtual Child Pornography Is Outside of the Scope of First
Amendment Protection
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... "125 But
this freedom is not absolute. 126 Certain types of expression are outside
the protection of the First Amendment. 127 Child pornography is one
such type of unprotected speech.128 "It is evident beyond the need for
elaboration" that states have a compelling interest in "safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor."' 29 The Ferber
Court recognized that "[a] democratic society rests, for its continu-
ance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens." 130 To that end, the Supreme Court has sus-
tained statutes aimed at protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of children' 3' "even when the laws have operated in the
sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights."' 32 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has recognized that states are "entitled to greater lee-
way in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children."'133
The Free Speech court erred in two ways by holding that Congress
may not constitutionally prohibit the production or dissemination of
virtual child pornography. First, contrary to the court's conclusion,
Congress had five important justifications for enacting the CPPA. Sec-
ond, the Ninth Circuit should have evaluated the CPPA under the
balancing approach suggested by the Supreme Court in Ferber and Os-
125. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
126. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
127. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952) (libelous speech); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571 (fighting
words).
128. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) ("There are .. .limits on the
category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First
Amendment.").
129. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
130. Id. at 757 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
131. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
132. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
133. Id. at 736.
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borne, rather than applying the strict scrutiny standard of review. As
suggested by the dissent in Free Speech, in upholding child pornogra-
phy statutes, Ferber and Osborne balanced the government's interest in
criminalizing child pornography against the limited social value of
such material. The Free Speech majority should have followed this ap-
proach, under which the CPPA is constitutional.
1. Five Important Justifications
In its findings which accompanied the CPPA, Congress articu-
lated five important justifications'3 4 for proscribing virtual child por-
nography: (a) to prevent pedophiles from using virtual child
pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity135 and thus
to protect children who are not actually depicted in the pornographic
image; 136 (b) to eliminate virtual child pornography as an incitement
for pedophiles to abuse children; 137 (c) to prevent pedophiles from
exploiting virtual child pornography's "built-in reasonable doubt ar-
gument" to escape prosecution;138 (d) to destroy the child pornogra-
phy market;139 and (e) to protect only speech that is of redeeming
social value. 1 40
a. Preventing Pedophiles from Using Virtual Child Pornography to
Seduce Children and Protecting Children Who Are Not
Depicted in Pornographic Material
Pedophiles often use child pornography to seduce children into
sexual activity. 14 Based on this determination, the Supreme Court in
Ferber stated that pornographic material "depicting sexual activity by
134. The author of this Note refers to these considerations as "important justifications"
in order to avoid confusion between terms of art used for judicial review under the "bal-
ancing approach" and those used for the strict scrutiny standard of review. See supra note
88. Were a court, such as the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech, to use a strict scrutiny approach,
the author believes these factors would be deemed "compelling government interests"
which would justify upholding the statute.
135. See Omnibus Act, supra note 119, § 121(1)(3).
136. See United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
115 (1999).
137. See Omnibus Act, supra note 119, § 121(1)(4).
138. Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 71 (testimony of Bruce A. Taylor, President and
Chief Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and Families).
139. SeeOmnibus Act, supra note 119, § 121(1)(12).
140. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
141. See Final Report, supra note 48, at 649; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 35
(statement of Dr. Victor Cline, a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist who worked with
victims of sexual abuse and assault).
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juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children."'142 In
her book, Child Pornography,1 43 Dr. Shirley O'Brien described this vi-
cious cycle of the sexual victimization of children: 144
(1) pornography is shown to the child for "sex education"; (2) at-
tempt to convince child explicit sex is acceptable, even desirable;
(3) child porn is used to convince child that other children are
sexually active-it's ok; (4) child pornography desensitizes-lowers
child's inhibitions; (5) some of these sessions progress to sexual
activity; (6) photographs or movies are taken of the sexual
activity. 145
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Osborne recognized a state's in-
terest in preventing pedophiles from "us[ing] child pornography to
seduce other children into sexual activity."1 46 Yet, the majority in Free
Speech argued that no factual studies currently exist linking virtual
child pornography with subsequent sexual abuse of children. 147 This
argument is misplaced. Technological advances in computer imaging
render it possible to produce virtual child pornography that is practi-
cally indistinguishable from real child pornography. 148 An unsuspect-
ing viewer (for example, a child, judge, police, prosecutor, or juror)
would not be able to tell whether the pornographic material was pro-
duced using real children.149 Because of a child's inability to make
this distinction, virtual child pornography has the "same seductive ef-
fect" on a child as real child pornography.1 50 Therefore, Congress has
an important justification for preventing pedophiles from using vir-
tual child pornography to seduce children into sexual activity.
The majority in Free Speech mistakenly suggested that protecting
those children used in producing child pornography is the only legiti-
mate justification for prohibiting it.'5' Although the Ferber Court fo-
cused on such protection, the Supreme Court in Osborne was willing to
consider additional factors.152 In upholding Ohio's ban on the posses-
sion of child pornography, the Osborne Court relied on evidence sug-
gesting that "pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other
142. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
143. SHILEY O'BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1992).
144. See id. at 89.
145. Id.
146. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
147. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999).
148. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15 (1996).
149. See Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 70.
150. Id.
151. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1092.
152. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990).
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children into sexual activity." 153 The First Circuit in Hilton properly
observed that the Osborne Court intimated a "subtle, yet crucial, exten-
sion of [Congress's] legitimate interest to the protection of children
not actually depicted in prohibited images." 154 Therefore, the Su-
preme Court has suggested that protecting children who are not de-
picted in pornographic materials is an important justification because
child pornography laws are meant to protect all children.
b. Eliminating Pornographic Materials That Inflame Pedophiles to
Sexually Abuse Children
In passing the CPPA, Congress found that pedophiles and child
abusers often use child pornography "to stimulate and whet their own
sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with chil-
dren."'155 Congress also concluded that child pornography "inflames
the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers
who prey on children, thereby increasing the creation and distribu-
tion of child pornography and the sexual abuse and exploitation of
actual children who are victimized as a result of the existence and use
of these materials."' 156
In his study, Dr. William Marshall found that 67% of child molest-
ers and 83% of rapists admitted to using hardcore sexual materials,
and that 53% of all child molesters said they deliberately view the
materials in preparation for molestation.1 57 DeeJensen, the president
of Enough Is Enough!, testified before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee that "child pornography is actually 'hard copy' . . . visualizations of
the pedophile's dangerous mental fantasies of having sex with chil-
dren." '5 a Child pornography is "an addiction that escalates, requiring
more graphic or violent material for arousal."'159 This addiction leads
pedophiles and child sexual abusers to view children in the porno-
graphic material as objects, having no "personality, rights, dignity, or
feelings."' 60 "The final stage is 'acting out,' doing what has been
153. Id. at 111. See also discussion supra note 48 and accompanying text.
154. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 70 (lst Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115
(1999).
155. Omnibus Act, supra note 119, § 121(1)(4).
156. Id. § 121(1)(10) (B).
157. See Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 92 (testimony of Bruce A. Taylor, President and
Chief Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and Families).
158. Id. at 38 (testimony of DeeJensen, President of Enough Is Enough!-a non-profit,
non-partisan women's organization opposing child pornography and illegal obscenity).
159. Id. at 39.
160 Id
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viewed in the pornography. This leads to crimes of sexual exploitation
and violence." 161
Dr. Victor Cline's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee supports the view that virtual child pornography inflames
pedophiles and child sexual abusers to abuse children just as much as
real child pornography does. 162 To such sexual predators, the slight
difference, if any, between real and virtual pornographic images in-
volving children are "irrelevant because [the virtual children] are per-
ceived as minors to [the predator's], psyche."'163 The stimulating
effects are the same. Thus, because of child pornography's vicious cy-
cle, 164 virtual child pornography, just like pornography using real chil-
dren, is a cause of sexual abuse of children. The courts should
recognize this as an important justification that does not offend the
First Amendment.
c. Closing the Loophole in Existing Law That Pedophiles Exploit
to Escape Prosecution
Under pre-CPPA child pornography laws, the government in a
child pornography prosecution must meet "its burden of proving [be-
yond a reasonable doubt] that a pornographic image is of a real
child.' 65 However, with the advent of virtual child pornography,
these pre-CPPA laws can easily be avoided. In enacting the CPPA,
Congress recognized that the advances in computer imaging technol-
ogy are making it virtually impossible to distinguish virtual child por-
nography from photographic depictions of real children in sexually
explicit activity. 166 Consequently, absent the CPPA, the government,
in a child pornography case, would have the almost impossible task of
meeting its burden of proving a real child was used. This is because
the accused can simply assert a "built-in reasonable doubt argu-
ment.1 67 That is, it will always be arguable that the child is not real
but virtual, and thus the defendant can establish a reasonable doubt
that a real child was not used in the pornography. The government's
inability to meet its burden of proof has the "effect of increasing the
161. Id.
162. See id. at 36.
163. Id. at 35-36 (testimony of Dr. Victor Cline, a clinical psychologist and
psychotherapist).
164. See O'BRIEN, supra note 143, at 89.
165. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 20 (1996).
166. See id.
167. Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 71 (testimony of Bruce A. Taylor, President and
Chief Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and Families).
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sexually abusive and exploitative use of children to produce child por-
nography" because the risk of punishment for such conduct is
reduced. 168
In United States v. Kimbrough,169 this loophole in child pornogra-
phy laws was raised as a legal defense. 170 There, the defendant argued
that the government must prove that each item of alleged child por-
nography did, in fact, depict an actual minor.171 The prosecution pre-
vailed only because of its "carefully executed cross-examination and
production, in court, of some of the original magazines from which
the computer-generated images were scanned." 172 The Kimbrough case
was tried in 1993, when computer imaging technology was in its in-
fancy, and thus the defense was not as potent as it could be in the near
future as technology rapidly progresses. 173 Moreover, because virtual
child pornography can be produced without scanning a child pornog-
raphy magazine into the computer, prosecutors can no longer intro-
duce the original magazine to the jury for comparison to the alleged
pornographic material. 74 Kimbrough is just one example of the poten-
tial ineffectiveness of pre-CPPA child pornography laws in light of the
advent of virtual child pornography. This "virtual child" loophole
could be exploited to allow sexual predators to escape criminal liabil-
ity. Congress was justified in enacting the CPPA to close this loophole
in existing law to protect children from molestation and sexual abuse.
d. Destroying the Child Pornography Market
The Supreme Court has recognized that states have an important
justification for destroying the child pornography market. 175 Congress
found that proscribing the possession of child pornography will en-
courage people to destroy such material, "thereby helping to protect
the victims of child pornography and to eliminate the market for the
sexual exploitative use of children."176 Since pedophiles trade and sell
virtual child pornographic materials for those that are of real children
168. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 20.
169. 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995).
170. See id. at 732-33.
171. See id.
172. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17.
173. See id.; Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 732.
174. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17.
175. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
176. Omnibus Act, supra note 119, § 121(1) (12).
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engaging in sexually explicit activities, virtual child pornography helps
"keep the market for child pornography thriving."'1 77
Furthermore, if virtual child pornography is not criminalized,
pedophiles who receive any child pornography would most likely keep
it, rationalizing that it might be virtual, since virtual and real child
pornography are practically indistinguishable. Because under pre-
CPPA law the government must prove that the pornographic material
involved real children in its production, these pedophiles would feel
even more secure in keeping the material, in that they could simply
assert the "built-in reasonable doubt argument. 178
The CPPA eliminates this legal defense and rationalization for
possessing child pornography. In addition, by prohibiting the produc-
tion and distribution of virtual child pornography, the CPPA also de-
creases the supply of and demand for all child pornography.
e. Virtual Child Pornography Has Little or No Social Value
The Free Speech court did not consider the fact that real and virtual
child pornography have little or no social value. It is well accepted
that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for bringing about the political and social changes
desired by people. ' 179 In Ferber, the Supreme Court, in holding that
child pornography is outside the protection of the First Amendment,
found that the value of child pornography "is exceedingly modest, if
not de minimis."'180
In terms of its social value, virtual child pornography should be
treated the same as real child pornography. First, in both forms chil-
dren are depicted engaging in sexually explicit activity. Second, to the
unsuspecting viewer (a child or an adult), virtual child pornography is
practically indistinguishable from real child pornography.
Importantly, Free Speech appears to have erred in finding that vir-
tual child pornography does not involve the use of real children.' 8 '
The truth is to the contrary. A pedophile could use virtual child por-
nography to seduce an innocent child into performing sexually ex-
plicit acts. After he photographs the acts, the pedophile could scan
177. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 91 (testimony of Bruce A. Taylor, President and Chief
Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and Families).
178. See discussion supra Part III.A.l.c.
179. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,J.,
dissenting) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
180. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982).
181. See Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1092.
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them into a computer and alter the child's characteristics to appear
virtual-i.e., unidentifiable as to the "real" child used to produce the
pornographic images. If virtual child pornography were legal, the
child would have been sexually exploited, abused, and victimized,
while the pedophile potentially escapes criminal liability. Because ad-
vances in computer imaging technology are rendering it practically
impossible to distinguish virtual from real child pornography, this sce-
nario is not at all far-fetched. In fact, because of these technological
advances, the pedophile will use virtual child pornography as a new
tool to sexually exploit, abuse, and victimize children. Therefore, vir-
tual child pornography, like its twin, real child pornography, should
be placed outside of First Amendment protection because it has
slight, if any, social value and constitutes "no essential part of the ex-
position of ideas."1 82
2. The Balancing Approach
The Free Speech court appears to have misread the Supreme
Court's prior child pornography decisions in Ferber and Osborne. In
neither of these cases did the Supreme Court apply strict scrutiny to
the child pornography statutes at issue.18 3 Rather, the Court used a
balancing approach-weighing the government's justifications for
proscribing child pornography against the limited social value of such
pornographic materials. 1 8 4
On the issue of categorizing child pornography, the Ferber Court
held that "the balance of competing interests [was] clearly struck and
that it [was] permissible to consider these materials as without the
protection of the First Amendment."' 8 5 As noted by the dissent in Free
Speech, in upholding Ohio's child pornography statute, the Osborne
Court found that the "'gravity of the State's interests' outweighed [the
defendant's] limitedFirst Amendment right to possess child pornog-
raphy." 186 These cases suggest that a balancing approach is the proper
standard of judicial review for laws prohibiting child pornography.
Following Ferber and Osborne, Free Speech should have analyzed the
CPPA under a balancing approach. Had the court in Free Speech ap-
182. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that "fighting
words" are outside of First Amendment protection).
183. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764; Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
184. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764; Osborne, 495 U.S. at I 11.
185. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at
764).
186. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1101 (Ferguson,J., dissenting) (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S.
at 111).
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plied such an approach, it would have found that Congress's five im-
portant justifications for proscribing virtual child pornography
discussed above clearly outweigh the de minimis value of such porno-
graphic material. 187
B. The CPPA Does Not Violate Due Process
A finding that the CPPA is constitutional under the First Amend-
ment does not end the analysis. The CPPA must also pass constitu-
tional muster under due process of law claims-that is, the twin
challenges of substantial overbreadth and void for vagueness. Con-
trary to the conclusion of the majority in Free Speech, the CPPA is
neither substantially overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague.
1. The CPPA Is Not Substantially Overbroad
In Free Speech, the constitutional challenges focused on the
CPPA's new definition of child pornography. Child pornography, as
defined in the CPPA, is any visual depiction that "appears to be" or is
promoted or distributed to "convey[ ] the impression that the mate-
rial is . . .of a minor engaging in -sexually explicit conduct."' 88 The
majority improperly found this language overbroad.
As the Supreme Court admonished, the overbreadth doctrine is
"strong medicine" that must be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort.'189 Accordingly, when a federal statute is challenged as over-
broad, a federal court "should, of course, construe the statute to avoid
constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting con-
struction."1 90 Generally, for a statute to be invalidated as overbroad,
the overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' 91
First, the Coalition argued that the "appears to be" language of
the CPPA 9 2 is so broad that it criminalizes speech that has been ac-
corded First Amendment protection. 193 However, the legislative his-
tory refutes this assertion. The purpose of the CPPA is to address
computer-generated child pornography.1 94 Congress intended the
new language to target the narrow class of visual depictions that are
187. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B), (D) (Supp. IV 1998).
189. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
190. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
191. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (Supp. IV 1998).
193. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999).
194. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
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"virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched
photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual con-
duct."1 95 The "appears to be" language "applies to the same type of
photographic images already prohibited, but ... does not require the
use of an actual minor in its production."' 9 6 In upholding the CPPA
against an overbreadth challenge, the First Circuit in Hilton con-
cluded that "drawings, cartoons, sculptures, and paintings depicting
youthful persons in sexually explicit poses plainly lie beyond the reach
of the Act."'197 The reason is that "[b]y definition, they would not be
'virtually indistinguishable' from an image of an actual minor. '" 198 The
CPPA's sweep is no broader than prior constitutional child pornogra-
phy laws.
Second, concerns that the CPPA proscribes pornographic materi-
als that contain youthful-looking adults engaging in sexually explicit
conduct are also unwarranted. Most of the prosecutions "under the
,appears to be a minor' provision" would involve sexually explicit
images of "pre-pubescent children or persons who otherwise clearly
appear to be under the age of 18."199 The reason is that "purveyors of
child pornography usually cater to pedophiles, who by definition have
a predilection for pre-pubertal children." 210 Moreover, the CPPA pro-
vides an affirmative defense to a charge of distributing, reproducing,
or selling child pornography. 20' Therefore, members of the Coalition
are shielded from prosecution so long as the pornographic material
they produce and distribute uses adults, and the members do not "in-
tentionally pander the material as being child pornography."20 2
While the CPPA might prohibit a tiny fraction of constitutionally
protected material (for example, "where youthful adults pose as chil-
dren for sexually provocative images with redeeming social value"),
this "does not render the statute as a whole substantially overbroad,"
in light of the CPPA's legitimate sweep.203 Instead, whatever potential
overbreadth may exist "should be cured through case-by-case analysis
195. Id.
196. Id. at 21.
197. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115
(1999).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 73.
200. Id.
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
202. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 21 (1996).
203. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74.
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of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be
applied. 20 4
2. The CPPA Is Not Void for Vagueness
The Free Speech court found that the CPPA's phrases "appears to
be"205 and "conveys the impression" 20 6 are void for vagueness because
they are "highly subjective" and could be enforced "in an arbitrary
and discriminatory fashion. '20 7 This finding is unjustified.
Holding the same language was not unconstitutionally vague, the
First Circuit in Hilton stated that the standard for invalidating a statute
"on vagueness grounds is a stringent one. ' 20 8 For the CPPA to be void
for vagueness, it must fail to "define the criminal offense with suffi-
cient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement. '"2 0 9
First, the terms "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" are
not highly subjective.210 "A jury must decide, based on the totality of
the circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting viewer would
consider the [pornographic material] to be of an actual individual
under the age of 18 engaged in sexual activity." 2 1 1 Although hardly
exhaustive, the following evidence could be presented to the jury to
allow an objective determination of whether the defendant is guilty:
[T]he physical characteristics of the person; expert testimony as to
the physical development of the depicted person; how the disk,
file, or video was labeled or marked by the creator or the distribu-
tor-of the image, or the defendant himself[;] . . . and the manner
in which the image was described, displayed, or advertised. 212
Where the case involves pre-pubescent children, the jury will con-
sider the sexually explicit material and determine whether the virtual
depiction "appears to be" a minor.213 On the other hand, where the
case involves post-pubescent children, expert witnesses will testify as to
the physical development of the person in the material and the man-
204. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B) (Supp. IV 1998).
206. Id. § 2256(8)(D).
207. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999).
208. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
209. Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting).
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ner in which the "creator, distributor, or possessor labeled the disks,
files, or videos." 214
Second, the challenged language does not allow arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement because the government must prove the ele-
ment of scienter to obtain a valid conviction. 215 Not only must the
government show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual
'knowingly' produced, distributed, or possessed" pornographic mate-
rial, but also that "the material depicts a person who appeared to [the
defendant] to be under the age of eighteen." 216 Thus, a defendant
must be acquitted if he honestly believes that the depicted person ap-
pears to be at least eighteen years old (and the jury believes him), or if
he can show that he knew youthful-looking adults were used to pro-
duce the sexually explicit visual depictions, and the visual depictions
were not presented or marketed as containing real minors. 217 Since
the terms "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provide an
ordinarily intelligent person with sufficient knowledge of what con-
duct is prohibited and do not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, the CPPA is not void for vagueness.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Free Speech that Congress cannot
constitutionally proscribe virtual child pornography departed dramati-
cally from the principles established by the Supreme Court in Ferber
and Osborne. The holding also directly conflicts with the well-reasoned
decisions of the First and Eleventh Circuits finding the CPPA constitu-
tional. Contrary to the finding in Free Speech, pedophiles, child molest-
ers, and child pornographers use real and virtual child pornography
to victimize, abuse, and exploit the most vulnerable members of our
society-children. The judiciary should support the legislative effort
to eliminate the scourge of all child pornography by upholding the
constitutionality of the CPPA. Failure to do so is not only contrary to
prior constitutional doctrine, but also jeopardizes our democratic so-
ciety, for its continuance rests "upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens." 218
214. Id. (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
216. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1103 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a) (1994)).
217. See United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 75-76 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 115 (1999).
218. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
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